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A Major Change for Minor Victims: A 
Call to Amend Rhode Island’s Statute 
of Limitations for Children’s Medical 
Malpractice Suits 
 
Brandon Ruggieri* 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In Rhode Island the statute of limitations for medical 
malpractice suits, codified at Section 9-1-14.1(1) of the Rhode 
Island General Laws, mandates that a plaintiff’s medical 
malpractice action be brought within three years from the time of 
the plaintiff’s alleged injury.1 However, if the plaintiff is a minor 
and such an action has not been brought on her behalf within the 
three year time period, then the plaintiff must bring the action 
within three years of reaching the age of the majority.2   Thus, 
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writing process. 
1. 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-14.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 542 of 
Jan. 2016 Sess.). 
2. Section 9-1-14.1 provides, in relevant part, that: 
[A]n action for medical . . . malpractice shall be commenced within 
three (3) years from the time of the occurrence of the incident which 
gave rise to the action; provided, however, that: (1) One who is under 
disability by reason of age . . . and on whose behalf no action is 
brought within the period of three (3) years from the time of the 
occurrence of the incident, shall bring the action within three (3) 
years from the removal of the disability. 
Id.  
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Section 9-1-14.1(1) offers a minor plaintiff “two windows” in which 
to bring her claim: (1) a claim that may be brought on her behalf 
by a parent or guardian within three years of the injury or 
reasonable discovery of the injury; or (2) a claim that the minor 
may bring on her own behalf anytime from the ages of eighteen to 
twenty-one.3 Nevertheless, in spite of these two windows, minor 
victims of medical malpractice are often not provided with a fair 
opportunity to have their claims adjudicated in the courts. 
In 2015, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
meaning and purpose of Section 9-1-14.1(1). In Ho-Rath v. Rhode 
Island Hospital, the court held, as a matter of first impression, 
that medical malpractice claims seeking to recover for injuries 
sustained by a minor may be brought by the minor’s parents or 
guardians either within three years from the date of the alleged 
malpractice incident, or by the minor on her own behalf within 
three years of reaching the age of majority.4 The majority’s 
“landmark decision”5 was countered by Justice Flaherty’s dissent; 
he argued that the better interpretation of the statute would be to 
“provide minors on whose behalf no suit has been filed within 
three years of an act of negligence the benefit of the tolling 
provision inherent in Section 9-1-14.1(1) and allow them to file  
suit at any time up until three years after they attain the age of 
majority.”6 
In 2010, Jean and Bunsan Ho-Rath (Plaintiffs) sued Rhode 
Island Hospital, Miriam Hospital, Women and Infants’ Hospital of 
Rhode Island, and numerous associated medical professionals7 
(Defendants) on behalf of their minor daughter Yendee Ho-Rath, 
who was born on January 9, 1998.8 Plaintiffs claimed that 
Defendants  were  negligent  in  the  diagnosis  and  treatment  of 
 
 
3. See id. 
4. 115 A.3d 938, 948 (R.I. 2015). 
5. MELISSA D. BERRY ET AL., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND TORT REFORM 34 
(2016),  Westlaw  HPTSIB  09-26-16.10. 
6. Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 955 (emphasis added). 
7. These medical professionals included Lewis Glasser, M.D., William 
Ferguson, M.D., Fred Schiffman, M.D., and B.E. Barker, Ph.D., who were all 
associated with Rhode Island Hospital and Miriam Hospital; and Calvin E. 
Oyer, M.D., Jami Star, M.D., and Marsha Sverdup, M.S. f/k/a Marsha 
Pagnotto, M.S., who were all associated with Women and Infants’ Hospital of 
Rhode Island.  Id. at 941 nn.2–3. 
8. Id. at 941. 
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Yendee’s genetic blood disorder, alpha thalassemia, and “also 
asserted individual claims against each of the Defendants for the 
loss of consortium of Yendee.”9 Specifically, “[P]laintiffs alleged 
that, although genetic testing for thalassemia was conducted on 
Jean, Bunsan, and Yendee’s older brother as early as 1993, 
[D]efendants had failed to correctly test, diagnose, and treat 
[P]laintiffs, resulting in Yendee being born with a debilitating 
genetic disorder.”10 In 2011, the trial court dismissed the case on 
the grounds that the statute of limitations had run since Plaintiffs 
waited twelve years to initiate their claims on behalf of Yendee.11 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed this decision and held 
that Section 9-1-14.1(1) permitted Yendee to sue on her own  
behalf when she reached the age of eighteen.12  The court also   
held that Plaintiffs’ derivative loss-of-consortium claims may be 
brought alongside Yendee’s claim when she turns eighteen.13 
In the lone dissenting opinion, Justice Flaherty found that the 
proper interpretation of Section 9-1-14.1(1) would allow the minor 
to bring suit at any time up until three years after she turns 
eighteen.14 Justice Flaherty argued that this  interpretation  
would achieve the legislative purpose of Section 9-1-14.1(1) 
because it would “eliminate[e] drawn-out litigation, which can,  
and does, occur in personal injury suits brought under Section 9-1- 
19, while not abrogating a minor’s right to relief or mandating  
that her claim grow stale in the intervening years before she 
reaches the age of majority.”15 
This Comment will not challenge the court’s interpretation of 
the statute, but rather will examine Ho-Rath, along with its 
relevant precedent, to determine if Section 9-1-14.1(1) provides 
minor medical malpractice victims with a fair opportunity to have 
their claims adjudicated. Using Justice Flaherty’s dissenting 
opinion in Ho-Rath as a preliminary base, this Comment  will 
argue  that  the  statute  should  be  changed  because  it  forces   a 
 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. See id. at 942. The facts provided failed to identify when Yendee’s 
genetic condition was discovered by Plaintiffs, and did not explain the reason 
for the twelve-year delay in Plaintiffs’ action.  See id. at 941–42. 
12. Id. at 948. 
13. Id. at 951. 
14. Id. at 952 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
15. Id. at 956. 
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blameless minor to wait years before she can bring suit, and in the 
most extreme circumstances up to fifteen years.16 As Justice 
Flaherty argues, “during this period, doctors may relocate, retire, 
or die; hospitals may close or merge; and records may become 
misplaced or lost.”17 In order to avoid these potential risks, this 
Comment will propose an amendment to Section 9-1-14.1(1) that 
would allow minors to bring suit at any time up until they turn 
twenty-one, and thus would provide minor victims of medical 
malpractice in Rhode Island with a better opportunity to have 
their claims adjudicated. 
This Comment examines both arguments in favor of and 
against Section 9-1-14.1(1) and concludes that the statute does not 
provide minor victims of medical malpractice with a fair 
opportunity to have their claims adjudicated. Part I outlines the 
relevant history of Section 9-1-14.1(1) and discusses three 
important cases predating Ho-Rath, which have addressed minor 
medical malpractice actions. Part II analyzes the arguments in 
support of and against Section 9-1-14.1(1), explaining why this 
statute does not provide minor victims with a fair opportunity to 
have their claims adjudicated and proposes an amendment to the 
statute. Part III compares Section 9-1-14.1(1) to other states’ 
statutes of limitation. This Comment concludes by  arguing  in 
favor of changing the law in order to allow minors to bring a 
medical malpractice suit anytime up until they reach the age of 
twenty-one. 
I. THE HISTORY OF RHODE ISLAND’S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS 
Under state law, the statute of limitations for a plaintiff’s 
claim may be “tolled” until some event, specified by law, takes 
place.18 Tolling provisions in state law are intended to benefit a 
plaintiff by extending the time period in which he or she is 
permitted to bring suit.19 Characteristically, a statute of 
limitations is tolled because of some supposed impediment to the 
 
 
16. Id. at 955. 
17. Id. 
18. 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 246, Westlaw (database 
updated June 2016). 
19. See id. 
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plaintiff’s pursuit of his or her claim.20 These impediments that 
trigger the tolling of a statute of limitations may vary from state  
to state, but often include minority, mental disability, 
imprisonment, or service in the armed forces.21 
In Rhode Island, the general provision for the tolling of the 
statute of limitations for personal injury claims of minors is 
Section 9-1-19 of the Rhode  Island  General  Laws.22  This 
provision, “which has been in existence[] without significant 
change[] for over one hundred years,”23 provides in pertinent part: 
If any person at the time any such cause of action shall 
accrue to him or her shall be under the age of eighteen 
(18) years, or of unsound mind, or beyond the limits of the 
United States, the person may bring the cause of action, 
within the time limited under this chapter, after the 
impediment is removed.24 
Section 9-1-19 of the Rhode Island General Laws operates for 
the protection of a minor.25 Pursuant to this provision, “a suit  
may be brought on behalf of a minor plaintiff in a personal injury 
action at any time until the minor reaches the age of majority, 
after which time the minor has three years to file suit on his or  
her own behalf.”26 When read alone, this general tolling provision 
provides minors with a significant opportunity to have their 
personal injury claims adjudicated because their suit may be 
brought at any time up until they turn twenty-one years old. 
However, during the 1970s, this general tolling provision was 
viewed as giving minors too broad of a protection in medical 
malpractice actions; thus, Rhode Island General Assembly enacted 
Section 9-1-14.1(1).27 
 
 
 
 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-19 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 542 of 
Jan. 2016 Sess.). 
23. Ho-Rath v. R.I. Hosp., 115 A.3d 938, 944 (R.I. 2015). 
24. § 9-1-19 (Westlaw). 
25. See id. 
26. Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 944 (citing Bishop v. Jaworski, 524 A.2d 1102, 
1102–03 (R.I. 1987)); Bliven v. Wheeler, 50 A. 644, 644 (1901)). 
27. See infra Section I.A.1. 
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A. Rhode Island’s Limitation on Minors’ Medical Malpractice 
Claims 
1. The 1970s Medical Malpractice Crisis: Purpose and Historical 
Context of Section 9-1-14.1(1) 
During the 1970s, the United States faced a medical 
malpractice crisis, which resulted in “huge increases in insurance 
premiums and the departure of some insurance carriers from 
malpractice underwriting.”28 In 1976, the Rhode Island General 
Assembly enacted Section 9-1-14.1, 
[A]s a legislative response to a medical malpractice crisis 
in the state. Faced with the crisis, the Legislature had 
legitimate interests in limiting the number of medical 
malpractice suits but, at the same time, in providing 
victims of medical malpractice with a fair opportunity to 
have their claims adjudicated in the courts.29 
Accordingly, Section 9-1-14.1(1) was intended to streamline 
the litigation of medical malpractice cases involving minors, while 
at the same time acting as a limitation on the general tolling 
provision for minors set forth in Section 9-1-19.30 While  this 
statute has succeeded in its intended purpose of limiting the 
number of medical malpractice suits in Rhode Island, questions 
remain whether this limitation gives minor victims a fair 
opportunity to have their claims adjudicated. 
2. Malpractice Statute of Limitations in the Rhode Island Courts 
Pre-Ho-Rath 
Ho-Rath was not the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s first 
encounter with minor medical malpractice actions. Three cases  
are of particular importance: Bakalakis v. Women & Infants’ 
Hospital,31 Dowd v. Rayner,32 and Rachal v. O’Neil.33  Together 
 
 
28. Glen O. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970’s: A 
Retrospective, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 5. 
29. Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 946 (quoting Dowd v. Rayner, 655 A.2d 679, 
681 (R.I. 1995)). 
30. Id. 
31. 619 A.2d 1105 (R.I. 1993). 
32. 655 A.2d 679 (R.I. 1995). 
33. 925 A.2d 920 (R.I. 2007). 
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these cases have helped to shape the law that governs minor 
medical malpractice and personal injury actions in Rhode Island. 
In Bakalakis, the court held that Section 9-1-14.1(1) is the only 
statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions  
and thus is not superseded by Section 9-1-19.34 In this case, the 
parents of a minor victim filed suit against numerous medical 
professionals, alleging negligent care at the time of birth of their 
son.35 The suit was filed within three years of the son’s birth.36 
Subsequently, more than three years after their son’s birth, the 
minor’s parents moved to amend their complaint to add two 
additional doctors as defendants.37 The court rejected the parents’ 
amended complaint and concluded that if parents file suit on 
behalf of a minor within three years of the alleged occurrence of 
malpractice, the parents cannot add new defendants after the 
three-year window has expired.38 
In 1995, the Dowd court held that Section 9-1-14.1(1) did not 
violate equal protection or the Rhode Island State Constitution.39 
Like Bakalakis, the plaintiffs in Dowd sought to amend their 
complaint in order to add additional medical professionals as 
defendants, but waited over seven years to do so.40 In this case,  
the court took the opportunity to comment on the legislative 
purpose of Section 9-1-14.1(1), and concluded that this provision 
restricts “multiple suits or amended complaints filed against 
additional defendants on a serial or piecemeal basis.”41 According 
to the court, this statute ensured that minors were not 
disadvantaged by their disability during their minority, while at 
the same time protecting possible defendants from stale claims.42 
Finally, in 2007, the court held in Rachal that Section 9-1- 
14.1(1) is a legislatively carved out exception to the general tolling 
provision for minors in Section 9-1-19.43 In Rachal, a minor’s 
parents  filed  a  personal  injury  suit  on  his  behalf  against  the 
 
34. Bakalakis, 619 A.2d at 1107. 
35. Id. at 1106. 
36. See id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 1107. 
39. Dowd v. Rayner, 655 A.2d 679, 680 (R.I. 1995). 
40. See id. 
41. Id. at 682. 
42. Id. 
43. Rachal v. O’Neil, 925 A.2d 920, 927 (R.I. 2007). 
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owner of a skate park, requesting damages for skateboarding 
injuries sustained on a half pipe at the park.44 More than a year 
later, the parents sought to amend their complaint to add the 
skate park as a defendant, but the lower court denied their 
motion.45 The court affirmed this decision and concluded  that 
under Section 9-1-14.1(1) “a parent[’s] . . . suit on behalf of a child 
for certain types of professional malpractice removes that child’s 
malpractice claims from the protection a tolling statute would 
otherwise offer.”46 
3. Ho-Rath 
In Ho-Rath, the Rhode Island Supreme Court was obligated to 
apply the plain meaning of Section 9-1-14.1(1).47 According to the 
statute, “[o]ne who is under disability by reason of age . . . and on 
whose behalf no action is brought within the period of three (3) 
years from the time of the occurrence of the incident, shall bring 
the action within three (3) years from the removal of the 
disability.”48 Even though the Ho-Rath majority correctly applied 
the plain meaning of Section 9-1-14.1(1),49 Justice Flaherty’s 
dissent highlights the tension between what the law requires and 
the unfortunate results that can harm “blameless” children.50 To 
afford minor victims of medical malpractice a fair opportunity to 
have their claims adjudicated, Rhode Island’s statute must be 
amended. 
II. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE AMENDMENT 
Section 9-1-14.1(1) of the Rhode Island General Laws does not 
provide minors with a fair opportunity to have their claims 
adjudicated because the statute sometimes forces the minor to  
wait years before they can bring suit if the minor’s parents have 
failed  to  bring  a  claim  on  the  minor’s  behalf.51    This  statute 
 
 
44. Id. at 922. 
45. Id. at 922–23. 
46. Id. at 925. 
47. Ho-Rath v. R.I. Hosp., 115 A.3d 938, 943 (R.I. 2015). 
48. 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-14.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch.  542 of 
Jan. 2016 Sess.). 
49. See 115 A.3d at 944, 946–47. 
50. See id. at 955 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
51. See § 9-1-14.1. 
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currently creates a serious conflict between the interests of the 
child and the interests of the State of Rhode Island. On the one 
hand, both the minor and the minor’s family have an interest in 
seeking relief in a timely manner to compensate for the alleged 
harm that the minor suffered. On the other hand, Rhode Island 
has an interest in streamlining medical malpractice litigation and 
in protecting possible defendants from stale claims.52 Although 
there are strong arguments on both sides, in order to properly 
protect the minor victim and provide the minor with a fair 
opportunity to have their claims adjudicated, Section 9-1-14.1(1) 
must be amended to allow a minor’s claim to be brought at any 
time up until the minor reaches the age of twenty-one. 
A. Arguments in Support of the Amendment 
1. The Prolonged Period of Exposure and a Minor Victim’s Right 
to Relief 
Section 9-1-14.1(1) of the Rhode Island General Laws must be 
amended to better protect a minor’s right to relief and to ensure 
that minors are afforded a fair opportunity to have their claims 
adjudicated within a  reasonable  time  period.  By  enacting 
Section 9-1-14.1(1), the Legislature sought to limit the number of 
medical malpractice claims and eliminate drawn-out medical 
malpractice litigation.53 Although Section 9-1-14.1(1) has largely 
succeeded in its intended purpose, its success has come at a high 
cost to minor victims. As Justice Flaherty described in Ho-Rath, if 
a minor’s parent is not diligent in bringing suit on behalf of the 
minor, then Section 9-1-14.1(1) will “abrogate[e] a minor’s right to 
relief or mandate[e] that [a minor’s] claim grow[s] stale in the 
intervening years before [they] reach[] the age of majority.”54 
Accordingly, Section 9-1-14.1(1) must be amended to prevent this 
abrogation of a minor’s right to relief.55 
Section 9-1-14.1(1) “prolongs the period of exposure to 
malpractice suits, and thus is inconsistent with [its] purpose of 
 
 
52. See Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 947 (majority  opinion); Dowd  v. Rayner, 
655 A.2d 679, 681–82 (R.I. 1995). 
53. See Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 946. 
54. Id. at 956 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
55. See id. at 955–56. 
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limiting malpractice litigation.”56 In fact, amending the statute 
might speed up litigation because missing the first three-year 
window would not necessitate that the minor wait until she 
reaches the age of majority to bring the action. Additionally, the 
intervening years before the minor reaches the age of eighteen 
could affect a minor’s right to relief. While some changes in 
circumstances may be beneficial—such as recovering from the 
alleged injury—many run the risk of being detrimental to the 
minor and their future claim. As Justice Flaherty described in Ho-
Rath, a minor’s doctor “may relocate, retire, or die; hospitals may 
close or merge; [or] records may become misplaced or lost.”57 In 
some circumstances, a minor may even die from her injuries (or 
other causes) without ever having the opportunity to bring suit.58 
To protect minors from these potential risks, they should be 
allowed to bring their claim at any time before they turn twenty- 
one. 
The risks that may occur during the intervening years before 
the minor turns eighteen undermine the minor’s fair opportunity 
to have the minor’s claims adjudicated. Time is of the essence in a 
minor’s medical malpractice suit. With each passing year, the 
potential harms that a minor may face grow in number and in 
likelihood, adding unnecessary obstacles to the minor’s suit and 
ultimately hurting the minor’s possibility of success in her future 
legal action. For example, consider Yendee’s case in Ho-Rath: 
although she may bring suit when she turns eighteen, many  
things can occur during the six intervening years.59 First, if her 
doctor, who allegedly misdiagnosed and improperly treated her 
blood disorder at birth, were to relocate or retire, she may have a 
difficult time locating and bringing suit against that doctor.60 
Second, if her doctor were to die during that time, she could lose 
 
56. William Jordan, Minors’ Medical Malpractice Claims May Be Brought 
by Parents Within Three Years of Date of Malpractice, or by Minors Within 
Three Years of Date of Majority, PROF’L LIAB. REPORTER (Thomson Reuters), 
July 2015, at NL 25, Westlaw 40 No. 7 Professional Liability Reporter NL 25. 
57. Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 955 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
58. See, e.g., Gretchen R. Fuhr, Civil Procedure/Tort Law—Better Off 
Dead?: Minority Tolling Provision Cannot Save Deceased Child’s Claim, 31 
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 491, 491 (2009) (child admitted to hospital for pain 
caused by sickle cell anemia and died next day from morphine overdose). 
59. See Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 955 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
60. See id. 
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the ability to bring any possible claims against him.61  Finally, if 
the hospital where her alleged injury took place closed or burned 
down, she may lose her medical records.62 Thus, Section 9-1- 
14.1(1) could force the minor’s claim to “grow stale” and  may 
result in a loss of evidence.63 By forcing a minor to wait years 
before she may bring her claim—in the most extreme cases up to 
fifteen years—Section 9-1-14.1(1) prolongs a minor’s period of 
exposure to malpractice suits, potentially nullifies a minor’s right 
to relief, and diminishes a minor’s chances of success in her future 
litigation.64 
2. Birth Injuries and “Dormant” Symptoms 
Section 9-1-14.1(1) must be amended to better protect a minor 
who has suffered an injury at birth and a minor whose symptoms 
do not arise until later in the minor’s life. A birth injury is “an 
impairment of the neonate’s body function or structure due to an 
adverse event that occurred at birth.”65 During the birthing 
process there is an increased risk of injury to not only the mother, 
but the infant as well.66 Some injuries cannot be avoided due to 
complications during the mother’s pregnancy or at birth, while 
others occur as a result of a medical professional’s negligence.67 
For example, during delivery, an infant may become oxygen 
deprived or suffer “broken bones, lacerations, or skull fractures” 
due to the malpractice of a medical professional.68 Similarly, as 
seen in Ho-Rath, the improper diagnosis and treatment of a blood 
 
 
 
61. See id. 
62. See id. 
63. See id.; Jordan, supra note 56. 
64. See Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 955 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
65. Tiffany M. McKee-Garrett, Neonatal Birth Injuries, WOLTERS 
KLUWER (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.uptodate.com/contents/neonatal-birth- 
injuries. 
66. “The 10 most common birth injuries include: Brachial Plexus Palsy 
(Erb’s Palsy . . . ), bone fractures, cephalohematoma, caput succedaneum . . . , 
perinatal asphyxia, intracranial hemorrhage, subconjunctival hemorrhage, 
facial paralysis; spinal cord injuries; and cerebral palsy . . . .” Birth Injury 
Statistics, BIRTH INJURY GUIDE, http://www.birthinjuryguide.org/birth- 
injury/statistics/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2017). 
67. See id. 
68. Birth Injury Types, BIRTH INJURY GUIDE, http://www. 
birthinjuryguide.org/birth-injury/types/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2017). 
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disorder may also result in an injury to the child.69 As discussed 
below, these injuries and their symptoms vary from one infant to 
another. Accordingly,  Section  9-1-14.1(1)  must  be amended in 
order to protect all minors who suffer from birth injuries and to 
account for the many differences in their injury-related symptoms. 
Section 9-1-14.1(1) must also be amended to shield those minors 
whose birth injury symptoms remain dormant for several years 
into a minor’s life. A minor’s birth injury may be temporary, while
 others may result in “permanent  disabilities and 
disfigurement.”70 The related symptoms of these birth injuries 
range in severity and differ in time of emergence.71 Often times 
the symptoms for certain birth injuries are immediate and can be 
recognized—possibly even treated—while the infant remains in 
the hospital.72 However, sometimes a child and her parents do 
not become aware of the child’s birth injures until later in the 
child’s life.73 These dormant symptoms may take years to surface 
and “signs of birth injuries [may not be] seen until [the] child 
develops  through growth  stages or begins school.”74 
Consequently, if a child’s symptoms do not emerge within the first 
three years of a child’s life or do not become “reasonab[ly] 
discover[able,]” then the child’s parents may be barred from filing 
a claim pursuant to Section 9-1-14.1(1).75 
Under Section 9-1-14.1(1), children who have suffered a birth 
injury may be forced to wait years before they can file a claim due 
to their dormant symptoms.76 For example, consider these two 
situations: (1) an infant suffers a birth-related injury due to a 
medical professional’s malpractice, but her symptoms do not 
develop until the child is four years old; and (2) a medical 
professional fails to adequately diagnose and treat an infant’s 
disorder, but symptoms of that disorder do not arise until the child 
is twelve years old. In each of these circumstances, if the child’s 
parents fail to bring a claim within three years of the discovery of 
 
69. Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 941 (majority opinion). 
70. Birth Injury Symptoms, BIRTH   INJURY   GUIDE, http://www. 
birthinjuryguide.org/birth-injury/symptoms/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2017). 
71. See id. 
72. See id. 
73. See id. 
74. Id. 
75. Ho-Rath v. R.I. Hosp., 115 A.3d 938, 946 (R.I. 2015). 
76. See, e.g., id. 
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the child’s symptoms then Section 9-1-14.1(1) will bar the child’s 
parents from ever bringing a claim on their child’s behalf. Though 
both children will be given the opportunity to bring suit upon 
turning eighteen, they must wait years in order to do so. 
Although birth injuries have become increasingly rare due in 
part to modern advancements in medical technology, such injuries 
will continue to occur both naturally and at the hands of medical 
professionals. Today, “[o]f every 1,000 infants born in the United 
States, 6 to 8 of them are born with a birth injury. That means 
that approximately 1 in every 9,714 people in the U.S. are born 
with a birth injury.”77 To respond to this ongoing issue, it is 
imperative that the Legislature amend Section 9-1-14.1(1). A 
child’s claim should not be mandated to “grow stale” as a result of 
a delayed emergence in the child’s symptoms.78 It is unacceptable 
to force a child to wait years to bring their own claim due to such 
circumstances, which are outside of the child’s control. Rather, 
children should be granted a longer period of time in which to 
bring their claim, so that their lawsuit is not unnecessarily 
delayed. Amending Section 9-1-14.1(1) will safeguard young 
victims and afford them a better chance of procuring damages for 
their injuries by granting them this extended period of time. 
3. Reduce the Burdens Placed on Minors and Their Families 
Amending Section 9-1-14.1(1) would protect minor victims 
from unforeseeable circumstances which are outside of their 
control. Medical malpractice litigation involving minors is often 
burdensome on all parties involved. However, such litigation can 
be especially burdensome on minors and their families.79 One 
burden which arises from Section 9-1-14.1(1) is that a minor is 
powerless under the law until she reaches the age of eighteen.80 
Until that time, the minor must rely on her parent to bring a  
claim on her behalf, and if her parent fails to do so, then the minor 
 
77. Birth Injury Statistics, supra note 66 (“Based on this information, 
28,000 per year are born with a birth injury, which is 2,333 per month, 538 
per week, 76 per day, and 3 per hour.”). 
78. See Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 956 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
79. In addition to financial burdens from having to wait years without 
compensation for damages, there may also be emotional burdens on  the  
minor and the family due to the highly sensitive information in the case. 
80. See 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-14.1 (West, Westlaw through  Ch. 
542 of Jan. 2016 Sess.). 
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is forced to wait to bring her own claim.81 By forcing a minor to 
wait, this statute punishes a minor for her parent’s failure to  
bring suit within three years of the minor’s alleged injury. 
Amending Section 9-1-14.1(1) will free minors from 
punishment and lighten the burden that the statute currently 
places on minors and their families. Under Section 9-1-14.1(1), a 
parent’s failure to bring suit may be the result of: (1) a lack of 
diligence;82 (2) a lack of knowledge;83 or (3) the inability to bring 
suit.84 Although the causes of a parent’s failure may differ, a 
minor’s punishment remains the same—she will be forced to wait 
for years before having the opportunity to bring her own claim. 
Currently, Section 9-1-14.1(1) does not distinguish between a 
parent’s mistake, inability, or decision, but instead focuses on the 
mere fact that a claim was not brought within three years of the 
alleged injury.85 However, by amending Section 9-1-14.1(1),  
minors will no longer be punished for their parent’s failure to sue 
on their behalf. Rather, this amendment will combat these causes 
and grant a minor a better opportunity to seek relief. 
Allowing a minor’s claim to be brought at any time until she 
turns twenty-one will benefit all parties involved in the litigation. 
This amendment would give minors a better opportunity to be 
heard in court, and may even lead to more timely litigation, as 
parents will no longer be barred from bringing claims on their 
children’s behalf. Amending Section 9-1-14.1(1) could actually 
speed up litigation because if the minor’s parent misses the first 
window, the minor would not have to wait until reaching the age 
of majority to bring the claim. Moreover, allowing a  minor’s 
parent to bring a claim at any time will preserve evidence,86 which 
 
81. See id. 
82. As discussed supra Section II.A.1, this occurs when a parent knows 
of a minor’s injury, but does not bring a timely suit in court within three  
years of the alleged injury. See, e.g., Dowd v. Rayner, 655 A.2d 679, 680 (R.I. 
1995). 
83. As discussed supra Section II.A.2, this occurs when a parent is 
unaware of the minor’s injury, and may not become aware of the injury until 
after three years have passed from the time the alleged injury took place. 
84. Parents of the minor may not have the financial means to fund a 
lawsuit, or the physical or legal ability to bring a claim within three years of 
the alleged injury. 
85. See § 9-1-14.1(1) (Westlaw). 
86. The theories in support of this argument are:  (1)  if  suits  are 
permitted to be brought at any time up until a minor turns twenty-one it will 
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would assist both parties in support of their arguments and aid  
the courts in making their rulings. However, critics of amendment 
argue that forcing a defendant (hospital, doctor, or other medical 
professional) to defend a claim at any time, for potentially twenty- 
one years, is burdensome on the defendant.87 While this may be a 
valid concern, it may be more acceptable to place this greater 
burden on possible defendants, rather than on a minor. 
Defendants, such as doctors, hold themselves to a high 
professional standard: they keep detailed medical records of 
patients and often have the means to hire defense counsel.  
Overall, these defendants, as compared to minor victims, are  
much better equipped to handle the rigors associated with 
litigation.  Minors, on the other hand, must rely on their parents  
to bring a claim on their behalf, hire an attorney, and obtain 
evidence that is not readily available  to  them.  Although 
amending Section 9-1-14.1(1) may place a greater burden on 
defendants, it will ultimately benefit both parties involved in the 
litigation by permitting lawsuits to be brought earlier and 
encouraging the preservation of evidence. 
B. Argugments Against the Amendment 
1. The Children’s Medical Malpractice Crisis 
Opponents to the amendment would argue that this change 
could result in a children’s medical malpractice crisis, similar to 
what occurred in Rhode Island during the 1970s.88 They would 
fear  that the  amendment will: (1) cause  an  increase  in  medical 
 
 
result in plaintiffs, and possible defendants, preserving evidence (i.e. medical 
records) that may be necessary to support their positions in future litigation; 
and (2) if there are less intervening years between the alleged injury and the 
suit, there will most likely be more evidence to preserve. See Ho-Rath, 115 
A.3d at 955–56 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
87. See, e.g., id. at 947 (majority opinion). 
88. See Robinson, supra note 28, at 6 (footnotes omitted) (“For health 
care providers the immediate crisis was essentially twofold: a sudden and 
substantial increase in malpractice insurance premium rates and, worse, the 
threat that liability coverage would become unavailable at any price as a 
consequence of carrier withdrawal from the field. For the carriers 
themselves, the crisis was an unanticipated increase in both the number of 
claims filed for negligent injuries and the amounts recovered. Rising 
underwriting costs were compounded by investment losses that a nationwide 
recession inflicted on insurance companies along with other investors.”). 
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malpractice litigation in Rhode Island; and (2) lead to “huge 
increases in insurance premiums” for children’s  medical 
coverage.89 First, opponents will likely argue that such an 
amendment  would  directly  conflict  with  the  purpose  of   
Section 9-1-14.1(1), which was to limit the number of medical 
malpractice suits in the state.90 By allowing a minor’s claim to be 
brought at any time, the Legislature would not only encourage, 
but also enable more suits to be brought in the courts. While an 
increased ability to sue may be beneficial for minor plaintiffs, the 
resultant influx of litigation may tie up the courts and, in turn, 
slow down the state’s judicial processes. Second, as a result of this 
influx, the cost of insuring children may increase, making it 
expensive for families to pay for medical coverage. Moreover, 
hospitals and medical professionals, fearful of being sued, would 
most likely charge higher prices for children’s care. Nonetheless, 
these fears are unfounded because today’s society is very different 
when compared to the 1970’s due to advancements in technology, 
health insurance, and medical malpractice law. As of now, 
opponents have offered no evidence that an  amendment  to 
Section 9-1-14.1(1) will result in increased litigation or that  
today’s legal and healthcare systems could not withstand such an 
increase if it occurred. 
2. Protecting Defendants and Encouraging Reasonable Diligence 
Opponents would argue that amending Section 9-1-14.1(1) 
fails to protect defendants from stale claims.91 As previously 
discussed, one intended purpose of Section 9-1-14.1(1) was to 
protect defendants from long, drawn-out litigation.92 This statute 
sought to encourage parents of minor victims “to act diligently in 
bringing claims on behalf of minors” within three years of the 
minor’s injury.93 Moreover, as seen in Dowd and Bakalakis, by 
limiting litigation to two distinct windows of opportunity, the 
Legislature wanted to protect possible defendants who could be 
added to ongoing suits.94  This limitation “restrict[s] . . .   multiple 
 
89. Id. at 5. 
90. See Dowd v. Rayner, 655 A.2d 679, 682 (R.I. 1995). 
91. See Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 948. 
92. See Dowd, 655 A.2d at 682. 
93. Jordan, supra note 56. 
94. Dowd,  655  A.2d  at  681–82;  Bakalakis,  619  A.2d  1105,  1107 (R.I. 
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suits or amended complaints filed against additional defendants 
on a serial or piecemeal basis.”95 Thus, opponents argue that the 
amendment would force defendants to be subject to stale claims 
and leave other potential defendants vulnerable to being included 
in a minor’s ongoing or future litigation.96 Although these are 
reasonable concerns for defendants, it is the current statute that 
mandates that claims grow stale by forcing the minor to wait  
years before bringing her claim. An amendment to Section 9-1-
14.1(1), on the other hand, seeks to limit stale claims and  speed 
up litigation by eliminating the waiting period to allow a minor to 
bring a claim at any time until her twenty-first birthday. 
3. Safeguarding a Minor’s Right to Relief 
Opponents to the amendment argue that Section 9-1-14.1(1) 
does not abrogate a minor’s right to relief because it affords a 
minor two windows of opportunity.97 As previously discussed, this 
statute: (1) permits a parent to bring suit on the minor’s behalf; 
and (2) protects the minor “if [her] parents or guardians fail to act 
diligently” in bringing suit.98 Although the minor may be exposed 
for a longer period of time, her parents’ failure to bring suit will 
not bar her own personal action. Upon turning eighteen,  the 
minor will be given the opportunity to seek relief on her own  
behalf no matter how many years have passed since the time of 
her injury. The only burden placed on the minor is that she 
personally will have to wait until she reaches eighteen to file a 
claim.99 Therefore, opponents argue that Section 9-1-14.1(1) 
should stand because it safeguards a minor’s right to relief by 
granting her two opportunities to bring a  claim.  However, 
because the current statute subjects the minor to a longer period  
of exposure, she is not given a fair opportunity to seek relief. 
Amending Section 9-1-14.1(1)’s provides minors with a better 
opportunity because it limits the period of exposure by allowing 
their claims to be brought earlier. 
 
 
1993). 
95. Dowd, 655 A.2d at 682. 
96. See, e.g., Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 950. 
97. See id. at 950–51. 
98. Jordan, supra note 56. 
99. See Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 950. 
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C. Proposed Amendment 
In light of these concerns, this Comment  proposes  that 
Section 9-1-14.1(1) be amended as follows: an action for medical 
malpractice involving an alleged minor victim shall be commenced 
at any time up until three (3) years after she has attained the age 
of the majority. One who is under disability by reason of age, and 
on whose behalf no action is brought, shall bring the action within 
three (3) years from the removal of the disability. 
III. RHODE ISLAND’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS COMPARED TO OTHER 
STATES 
Across the United States, states have statutes of limitation 
that govern medical malpractice claims, and “[t]he majority of the 
states have special provisions regarding the time limits for minors 
to file medical malpractice claims.”100 The purpose of a state’s 
statute of limitations is not only to protect defendants from long- 
dormant claims, but also to encourage plaintiffs to bring an action 
with reasonable diligence.101 However, each state’s statute seeks 
to accomplish this purpose in different ways. States’ statutes of 
limitation for medical malpractice claims generally fall within four 
broad categories: (1) those that do not have special provisions for 
minor victims; (2) those that have special provisions for minor 
victims; (3) those  that provide  “two  windows” of opportunity; and 
(4) those that do not count the time period before a minor’s 
eighteenth birthday as part of the time limit imposed by the 
state’s general statute of limitations.102 
A. States Without Special Provisions for Minors 
State statutes that fall within the first category are the most 
restrictive on a minor’s claim. While the majority of states have 
special  provisions  regarding  the  time  limits  for  minors  to  file 
 
 
100. See Heather Morton, Medical Liability/Malpractice Statutes of 
Limitation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 20, 2014), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/medical- 
liability-malpractice-statutes-of-limitation.aspx. 
101. Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of 
Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAC. L. J. 453, 488 (1997). 
102. See Morton, supra note 100 (providing comprehensive list of state 
statutes dealing with statutes of limitation for medical malpractice claims). 
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medical malpractice claims, there are some states that do not. For 
example, in Connecticut and Louisiana, an action brought on 
behalf of the minor must adhere to the same general statute of 
limitations governing medical  malpractice  claims.103  Unlike 
Rhode Island, these states do not provide minor victims with 
additional time in which to bring their claim, but rather mandate 
that a claim on the minor’s behalf be brought within one to three 
years after the date of the alleged injury or discovery.104 Thus, 
state statutes such as those found in Connecticut and Louisiana, 
which do not have special provisions for minor victims, are 
considered to be among the most restrictive on a minor’s claim. 
B. States with Special Provisions for Minor Victims of Medical 
Malpractice 
State statutes that fall within this second category are more 
restrictive on a minor’s claim than Rhode’s Island’s current (and 
amended) statute. Some states have special provisions for minor 
victims under a certain age that limit the time in which an action 
 
 
103. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2017 
Legis. Sess.) (“No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real 
or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton 
misconduct, or by malpractice of a physician, surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, 
chiropractor, hospital or sanatorium, shall be brought but within two years 
from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in  the 
exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no 
such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or 
omission complained of, except that a counterclaim may be interposed in any 
such action any time before the pleadings in such action are finally closed.”); 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628 (Westlaw through 2016 First Extraordinary, Regular, 
and Second Extraordinary Sess.) (“No action for damages for injury or death 
against any physician, chiropractor, nurse, licensed midwife practitioner, 
dentist, psychologist, optometrist, hospital or nursing home duly licensed 
under the laws of this state, or community blood center or tissue bank . . . 
whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of 
patient care shall be brought unless filed within one year from the date of the 
alleged act, omission, or neglect, or within one year from the date of discovery 
of the alleged act, omission, or neglect; however, even as to  claims  filed 
within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events  such  claims 
shall be filed at the latest within a period of three years from the date of the 
alleged act, omission, or neglect. The provisions of this Section shall apply to 
all persons whether or not infirm or under disability of any kind and 
including minors and interdicts.”) (emphasis added). 
104. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (Westlaw); LA. STAT. ANN. § 
9:5628 (Westlaw). 
  
 
2017] MINORITY TOLLING PROVISIONS 689 
 
may be brought on their behalf. For example, in Massachusetts, 
the statute of limitations provides that minors under the age of six 
have only until their ninth birthday for a claim to be brought on 
their behalf or else they will be barred from bringing suit.105 
Unlike Rhode Island’s statute, Massachusetts’s statute fails to 
provide minors with a second “window” of opportunity when they 
reach the age of majority. Although statutes within this category 
provide minor victims with some additional protection, children 
are left without a second chance at relief if their parents fail to 
bring a claim on their behalf within the designated time period. 
C. States that Provide “Two Windows” of Opportunity 
Similar to Rhode Island, there are a number of states that 
provide minor victims of medical malpractice with “two windows” 
of opportunity. For example, in New Hampshire and Ohio, a 
medical malpractice action involving a minor victim may: (1) be 
brought on behalf of the minor after the injury or reasonable 
discovery of the injury;106 or (2) be brought by the victim when 
 
 
105. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60D (Westlaw through 2016 2nd 
Annual Sess. and ch. 1 of 2017 1st Annual Sess.) (“[M]inor[s] under the full 
age of six years shall have until his ninth birthday in which the action may  
be commenced, but in no event shall any such action be commenced more 
than seven years after occurrence of the act or omission which is the alleged 
cause of the injury upon which such action is based except where the action is 
based upon the leaving of a foreign object in the body.”). 
106. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4(1) (Westlaw through ch. 1 of 2017 Reg. 
Sess.) (“[A]ll personal actions . . . may be brought only within 3 years of the 
act or omission complained of, except that when the injury and its causal 
relationship to the act or omission were not discovered and could not 
reasonably have been discovered at the time of the act or omission, the action 
shall be commenced within 3 years of the time the plaintiff discovers, or in   
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury and its 
causal relationship to the act or omission complained of.”); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2305.113(C)–(D) (Westlaw through 2017–2018 Legis. Sess.)  (“No 
action upon a medical . . . claim shall be commenced more than four years 
after the occurrence of the act or omission constituting the alleged basis of   
the medical . . . claim. If an action upon a medical . . . claim  is  not 
commenced within four years after the occurrence of the act or omission 
constituting the alleged basis of the medical . . . claim, then, any action upon 
that claim is barred. If a person making a medical claim . . . could not have 
discovered the injury resulting from the act or omission constituting the 
alleged basis of the claim within three years after the occurrence of the act or 
omission, but, in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, discovers the 
injury resulting  from  that act or omission  before the  expiration  of the  four- 
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reaching eighteen.107 While the time limits for each window vary 
from state to state, what is common within this category is that 
minors are provided with two chances to seek relief.108 
It is evident from this comparison that Rhode  Island’s  
Section 9-1-14.1(1) is liberal as compared to several other state 
statutes that fall within sections A and B; however, it is more 
restrictive than states in section D discussed below. Opponents to 
amending Section 9-1-14.1(1) will argue that there is no need to go 
further because Rhode Island provides minor victims of medical 
malpractice with two fair opportunities for relief, while some 
states have no special provisions for minors or place greater 
restrictions upon them. However, as previously discussed, there 
are issues that can arise when a state chooses to adopt a “two 
window” statute. To this point, Rhode Island has taken necessary 
steps to ensure that minor victims have a better chance at relief, 
but more can be done. Rhode Island should commit to making the 
process as accessible as possible to minors by adopting amended 
Section 9-1-14.1(1). 
 
 
year period . . . , the person may commence an action upon the claim not later 
than one year after the person discovers the injury resulting from that act or 
omission. If the alleged basis of a medical claim . . . is the occurrence of an  
act or omission that involves a foreign object that is left in the body of the 
person making the claim, the person may commence an action upon the claim 
not later than one year after the person discovered the foreign object or not 
later than one year after the person, with reasonable care and diligence, 
should have discovered the foreign object. A person  who  commences  an 
action upon a medical claim . . . under the circumstances described in . . . this 
section has the affirmative burden of proving, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that the person, with reasonable care and diligence, could not have 
discovered the injury resulting from the act or omission constituting the 
alleged basis of the claim within the [stated] period[s] described in . . . this 
section . . . .”). 
107. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:8 (Westlaw) (“An infant or mentally 
incompetent person may bring a personal action within 2 years after such 
disability is removed.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.16 (Westlaw) (“[I]f a 
person entitled to bring an[] action mentioned in [section 2305:113] . . . is, at 
the time the cause of action accrues, within the age of minority or of unsound 
mind, the person may bring it within the respective times limited by [section 
2305:113], after the disability is removed.”). 
108. Today, there are approximately thirteen states that have adopted a 
similar version of this “two window” statute: Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Vermont. See Morton, supra note 
100. 
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D. States that Do Not Count the Time Period Before a Minor’s 
Eighteenth Birthday 
Some states have already implemented statutes similar to 
amended Section 9-1-14.1(1) that are less restrictive on a minor’s 
claim than Rhode’s Island’s current statute. These states do not 
count the time period before a person’s eighteenth birthday as  
part of the time limit imposed by the state’s general statute of 
limitations. For example, in Arizona and the District of Columbia, 
the time restriction placed on a minor does not begin to run until 
after the minor reaches the age of eighteen.109 Unlike in Rhode 
Island, a claim that is brought on behalf of a minor is not subject  
to the general statute and may be brought at any time until the 
minor turns eighteen.110 However, when the minor reaches 
eighteen the statute of limitations will begin to run, and they  
must bring a claim within the designated time.111 Other states 
including New York and North Dakota have passed similar 
statutes, but have added an additional time restriction that limits 
how long the extension of the statute lasts.112 For example, in 
North Dakota, “the extension of the limitation due to infancy is 
limited to twelve years[,]” meaning that the period within which 
the action must be brought cannot exceed twelve years after the 
minor’s injury occurred.113  Thus, these statutes are considered to 
 
 
109. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-502 (Westlaw through 2017 First Reg. 
Legis. Sess.) (“If a person . . . is at the time the cause of action accrues either 
under eighteen years of age or of unsound mind, the period of such disability 
shall not be deemed a portion of the period limited for commencement of the 
action. Such person shall have the same time after removal of the disability 
which is allowed to others.”); D.C. Code Ann. § 12-302 (Westlaw through Mar. 
12, 2017) (“[W]hen a person entitled to maintain an action is, at the time the 
right of action accrues . . . under 18 years of age . . . he or his proper 
representative may bring action within the time limited after the disability is 
removed.”). 
110. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-502 (Westlaw); D.C. Code Ann. § 
12-302 (Westlaw). 
111. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-502 (Westlaw); D.C. Code Ann. § 
12-302 (Westlaw). 
112. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 208 (MCKINNEY Westlaw through 2017 Legis. 
Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 28-01-25 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
113. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 28-01-25 (Westlaw); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 
208 (MCKINNEY Westlaw) (“The time within which the action must be 
commenced shall not be extended by this provision beyond ten years after the 
cause of action accrues . . . .”). 
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be among the most lenient in the country because the time period 
before the minor’s eighteenth birthday is not counted as part of  
the statute’s time limit. 
CONCLUSION 
Rhode Island General Laws Section 9-1-14.1(1) does not 
provide minor victims of medical malpractice with a fair 
opportunity to have their claims adjudicated. Under Section 9-1- 
14.1(1), if a minor’s parents fail to bring a claim her behalf, then 
she is forced to wait years before she may bring her own claim. As 
Ho-Rath illustrates, by mandating a minor’s claim to “grow stale,” 
it subjects the minor to a long period of exposure and, ultimately, 
“abrogat[es] a minor’s right to relief.”114 To afford minors a better 
opportunity to have their claims adjudicated, Section 9-1-14.1(1) 
must be amended to permit a minor’s claim to be brought at any 
time up until the minor reaches the age of twenty-one.115 
“Minority tolling provisions, [like amended Section 9-1- 
14.1(1),] enable minors to realize the full scope of the harm 
inflicted on them before filing suit.”116 This amendment seeks to 
minimize harm to a minor by shortening the period of exposure 
and enabling a minor’s claim to be brought at any time, rather 
than restricting it to two windows of opportunity under the  
current statute. By permitting lawsuits to be brought earlier, the 
Rhode Island General Assembly would encourage the preservation 
of evidence, reduce the number of potential risks that threaten 
minor victims’ claims, and ultimately increase minors’ likelihood  
of   success   in   their   litigation.117   Moreover,   amending  
Section 9-1-14.1(1) would further the goals of the tort system as 
minor plaintiffs will have “an opportunity to be heard and can be 
compensated for their losses while physicians [will be] deterred 
from wrongdoing.”118 This major change for minor victims will 
help to ensure that a defendant’s negligence does not  go 
overlooked or unpunished in the State of Rhode Island. 
 
 
114. Ho-Rath v. R.I. Hosp., 115 A.3d 938, 956 (R.I. 2015) (Flaherty, J., 
dissenting). 
115. Id. at 955. 
116. Fuhr, supra note 58, at 533. 
117. See Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 955–56. 
118. Fuhr, supra note 58, at 533. 
